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Administrative Reform in a Liberal Market Economy
Niamh Hardiman and Muiris Mac Cárthaigh
Introduction
Since the wave of ideas favouring market-conforming politics swept across western societies
during the 1980s, the scope of modern government has become more contentious. NPM
belongs to the same shift in ideological orientation and political discourse. The cluster of
ideas underpinning NPM is many-faceted and comes from diverse sources, including
concerns about vested producer interests in the public sector, attempts to extend competition
between providers, introduction of performance measurement targets, etc. And so a wide
range of changes in public sector organization, service delivery, and employment relations
may be affected.
There are by now a number of well-recognized problems with trying to take a measure of
shifts in state capacity and competences, and to assess their consequences, under the umbrella
concept of NPM, three of which we find particularly interesting. The first is that the range of
practices embraced by NPM is potentially quite elastic in its application. The second
concerns the difficulty in establishing a metric according to which procedural or
organizational changes are held to have been successful or not. Attempts to measure
productivity and efficiency in public administration are notoriously difficult and contested.
Creation of performance targets is known to have perverse effects of incentivizing
performance aimed at meeting the relevant metric, which is often a proxy for a qualitative
change in performance and outcomes. The third problem is that public sector reform priorities
might not actually be contributing anything we can clearly identify as beneficial changes to
the quality of government, or even good governance, on any of the criteria that are emerging
in the literature. This arises partly from problems of defining and assessing what we mean by
NPM and post-NPM. But it also points to definitional and measurement problems associated
with quality of government.
This paper seeks to explore what the principal patterns of change in the public sector have
been in Ireland, to explain what happened and why. We try to show that while Ireland scores
well on measures relating to the quality of government, these are not capturing some of the
core challenges that are believed to characterize processes of policy making and2
implementation. While we are not sure we can contribute substantively at this stage to
extending the debate about the quality of government in the sense of effective and efficient
policy making and implementation, we at least raise some questions about how we might
think about it.
Public sector reform
A number of paired terms regularly feature in discussions of trends in modern governance
which are often posited as antinomies, such as accountability and efficiency, or hierarchy and
networks, or rule-following and flexibility. Broadly characterized in this manner, we can see
why features of the Weberian state are thought to be incompatible with the principal
objectives of NPM. And indeed where NPM was introduced most thoroughly, particularly
Britain and New Zealand, new modes of management through outcome-based budgets,
performance targets, and delegated authority represented a departure from older traditions
and practices of public service activities. However, even in Britain and NZ, these features
may not have been as all-encompassing as many have assumed; the ‘NPM revolution’ itself
depended on core policy competences and a capacity to rule from the centre (Holliday 2000).
And the evident shortcomings of the purest form of NPM in turn have given rise to an often
bewildering variety of initiatives in ‘post-NPM’, as the need to reintegrate policy formation
and implementation become apparent, and the merits of classic bureaucratic practices are
rediscovered (Christensen and Laegreid 2007; Olsen 2005).
Linking these debates with a focus on what it means to speak about good governance, or
quality of government, is more problematic again. This is especially the case when we find
that on the most commonly used comparative indicators such as the World Bank’s measures
of good governance, notwithstanding some variations in performance among the most
developed countries, that all tend to score very well indeed relatively to developing countries
on most measures (Kaufmann et al. 2008; Kitschelt and Wilkinson 2007). Finding
appropriate measures to assess what counts as good administrative practice, and successful
administrative reform, is a challenge.
We are persuaded by Rothstein and Teorell’s conception of good governance as the design
and implementation of institutions committed to impartiality (Rothstein and Teorell 2008).
Finding the right measures to assess departure from these standards is still contested, but3
arbitrariness in the application of rules, and corruption of decision-making to the advantage
of private interests, are still probably the best indicators (Rose-Ackerman 1999). But perhaps
the criteria associated with impartiality and incorruptibility of the public administration
should be thought of as an irreducible minimum for good governance, rather than a principal
identifier. Corruption scandals may emanate from within the executive, specifically from the
nexus of governing parties and business or other private interests; or from failures to accept
political responsibility and accountability for poor decision-making or systems failures, rather
than from poor administrative practices. Correspondingly, impartiality in the sense of lack of
corruption in public administration might nevertheless be associated with shortcomings on
other measures such as efficiency, accountability, or expertise, leading to poor quality policy
formulation and implementation. But finding appropriate measures to assess what counts as
good administrative practice and successful administrative reform, and tracking these in
practice, is a challenge. Even where well-defined procedural rules exclude the possibility, by
and large, of institutionalized corruption or arbitrariness, and even where administrative
reforms have been implemented, there may be real problems in the efficiency and
effectiveness, and also the accountability and legitimacy of public sector activities, that may
need to be probed further.
The OECD summarised early NPM initiatives in the UK, New Zealand and Australia as
attempts to tackle the efficiency issues, that is, to make the public sector ‘lean and
competitive while, at the same time, trying to make public administration more responsive to
citizens’ needs by offering value for money, choice flexibility and transparency’ (Groot and
Budding 2008). These attempts have since been imitated to varying degrees in a wide variety
of states in what has since become known as the New Public Management movement. As
has been well-documented, with its origins in new institutional economics, management
sciences and the influence of neo-classical economics on public administration, NPM has
been used to denote a wide variety of public sector reform programmes that have emerged
since the early 1980s. Kettl suggests that NPM’s most prominent virtue has been its ‘sharp
and clear definition of the problem of modern government and of the solutions that would fix
it’ (Kettl 2006, p.314). However, others argue that there is no broad agreement on the key
features of NPM (Hood and Peters 2004).4
NPM and Post-NPM in Ireland
Ireland can be understood as a liberal market economy in Hall and Soskice’s terms (Hall and
Soskice 2001); it has also been heavily reliant on FDI, on trade, on exports, and especially on
non-manufactured service-sector internationally tradable activities (Barry 2007). These
features might lead us to anticipate that Ireland would be highly attuned to market-based
disciplines in the state sector, and that it would have been to the forefront of NPM
experiments. It might also have been thought that Ireland, which proved so successful in
generating economic recovery from the disastrous recession and fiscal crises of the 1980s,
would have developed a wide-ranging policy competence to effect public sector reform.
However, we would suggest that neither of these expectations is in fact borne out in practice.
Our contention is that the Irish experience represents a decidedly mixed case of policy styles.
This can of course be said of all countries – NPM and its successor initiatives are typically
found in some nationally hybrid form. Initiatives in public sector modernization, structural
changes to the public service, and innovations in design of and rewards for careers in the
public service, commonly display some elements of NPM thinking; but within an overall
style of service delivery that retains core features of classic bureaucratic design (Gualmini
2008; Olsen 2005).
However, Ireland was different from other Westminster-type systems in having resisted most
of the core thinking behind NPM. Public sector reform in Ireland was undertaken by
modernization-minded senior civil servants themselves. This has to be explained in the
context of a party political system in which the conventional left-right is only weakly present.
While the smaller parties can readily be identifiable in a comparative European context as
either Social Democratic/ left (the Labour Party), Green, or liberal (the Progressive
Democrats), the two largest parties (Fianna Fáil and Fine Gael) cluster on the centre-right and
are virtually indistinguishable in policy terms (Laver 1992; Laver and Benoit 2003). The
origins of the party system are found not in conventional European cleavage politics, but in
the history of nationalist separatist politics early in the lifetime of the independent state. The
two largest parties function as catchall parties; and the trend toward coalition government
strengthens the bias toward inclusive policy stances and avoidance of overt ideological
partisanship. This may help to explain why no government has taken up a strong stance that
could risk bringing it into confrontation with the public administration, but has preferred to5
allow these issues to be dealt with through negotiation, and for changes in work practices to
be managed in conjunction with pay negotiations through the corporatist social partnership
institutions.
Institutional innovation in Ireland therefore bears some resemblances to NPM-style
developments, but was not strongly guided by this thinking, rather by a more ad hoc approach
to improving administrative efficiency. This particular mixture of Weberian and partial NPM
administrative procedures is also now being subject to scrutiny in terms of ‘post-NPM’
objectives. Implicit in the sequences of events is a set of concerns with efficiency and
effectiveness, administrative simplicity and political accountability. But without clear
performance measures or clarity about potential trade-offs, a rather mixed outcome ensues.
We outline some of the main features of public sector reform initiatives in Ireland, then
highlight some specific areas where performance issues have arisen, and assess how best
these can be analysed within our competing conceptions of public sector organization.
NPM does not constitute a theory, but rather an approach, a set of values, and a menu of
actions; and the same goes for post-NPM initiatives. We might usefully identify four aspects
of the public service within the kind of Whitehall-style bureaucracy that Ireland shares in
common with Britain, within which both NPM trends and post-NPM developments can be
identified. These are career structures; institutional diversification; policy coordination; and
the public sector value system. These four dimensions can be thought of as having distinctive
features that cluster in three different ways, depending on the principle of organization and
policy processes that are in question: classic or traditional Weberian, NPM, and post-NPM.
These are summarized in Figure 1 below, where the approximate time-periods during which
they are identifiable in Ireland are also noted.
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We would suggest that Irish public administration has undertaken most change in the first
category, i.e. career structures. It displays some change in the second, institutional category,
though for reasons we do not think are clearly driven by NPM. We identify some change but
to quite limited degrees in the third category, that of policy coordination, and the fourth, the
values specific to the public sector. In other words, it is still largely a ‘classic’ Whitehall-type
state administration. And insofar as post-NPM reform challenges have arisen they are still at
an early stage for the most part.
Sustained public sector reform in Ireland has been under way since the mid-1990s: what is
termed the Strategic Management Initiative was first launched in 1994 (see
www.bettergov.ie). The full timeline and key developments are set out in Appendix 1. But
unlike other English-speaking countries in which NPM took strongest hold, this was not
undertaken under strong political guidance or within a well specified ideological context.
Rather, it was an initiative that came from within the civil service itself, housed within the
Department of Finance and driven by the senior civil servants in the Department of the
Taoiseach, under the broad remit of a ‘modernization agenda’. While political inputs have
also been crucial in reshaping aspects of public service organization, we would suggest that
few fundamental changes have been supported at a political level, and that such change as has
occurred has been inconsistent. During fifteen years of economic boom and population
growth, public sector modernization has involved a search for ‘quality customer services,
regulatory reform, openness and transparency, human resource management, financial
management, information technology’ (OECD 2008, pp.88-9). However, we see rather
limited commitment in anything other than general terms to quality assessment, policy
evaluation relative to identifiable performance criteria, or clear policy feedback channels.8
As Ireland faces a severe economic downturn, the talk once again is about introducing greater
efficiency, streamlining organization, improving the quality of performance, and measuring
output more effectively – in other words, modernizing and improving the quality of the
public administration and public services. In this context, the government commissioned the
OECD to undertake its first ever complete review of a public service. When the final report
was eventually published in spring 2008, it made a number of penetrating comments about
the quality of government, or at least the quality of government services delivered by the
public administration (OECD 2008). But this surely, at a minimum, begs the question as to
what exactly has been going on under the name of public sector reform over the preceding
fifteen years.
While the term New Public Management had been avoided by government during the course
of the reform agenda, the OECD report announced that Ireland ‘has significantly advanced
along a ‘New Public Management’ (italics in original) continuum, and now finds itself
entering into new territory in advancing its public management reform programme’ (OECD
2008, p.18). The report’s title Towards an Integrated Public Service indicated a need to
rationalize if not reverse the structural and functional fragmentation that had taken place as a
consequence of the modernization process. The report proposed that a ‘more integrated
approach at national and local level’ will allow Ireland meet the challenges of achieving
wider societal goals and delivery of ‘coherent and integrated services’ (OECD 2008, p.18),
and that ‘the Irish government needs to find a new reform agenda that focuses on value for
money, while maintaining the most important elements of its political culture and values’
(OECD 2008, p.23). It summarized the previous decade and a half of reforms as having
being primarily focused on putting processes in place and noted that ‘the incremental
approach to reform, while achieving a certain degree of stability and consensus, has led to
isolated reforms that evolve over time, rather than as a coherent reform package. The next
challenge is to renew the vision originally laid out in SMI, taking into account the coherence
of reforms and how they interact with one another’ (OECD 2008, p.24). In a nod to post-
NPM ideas, its concluding remark was that ‘an integrated Public Service will depend on
changing behaviour rather than structures’ (OECD 2008, p.44).9
What, then, can be said about changes that have taken place under each of the four headings
noted in Figure 1 – careers, organizational structures, policy making and coordination, and
the distinctiveness of public sector values?
1. Careers
The core Irish civil service continues to be characterized by a generalist intake and a
commitment to political neutrality. The biggest change arising from the modernization
agenda affects promotional structures and pay determination.
Two innovations may be noted. Firstly, top-level appointments (to Assistant Secretary-
General level and above) have been subject to recommendations by the Top-Level
Appointments Committee (TLAC) since 1984 – see:
http://www.finance.gov.ie/documents/publications/other/TLACprocedures06.pdf. This
abolished the old principle of advancement based on seniority within Departments, by
opening up promotional opportunities across Departments on a competitive basis. The TLAC
removes the process for almost all senior appointments from direct political influence (though
several senior posts are still ultimately filled by Government). For all Secretary-General
positions, the TLAC is required to submit up to three suitable nominees to government.
Alongside this we see a separate remuneration process for top civil servants, determined by a
series of Review Bodies for Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector (see
http://www.reviewbody.gov.ie). In recent years this has recommended pay increases that
have seen a convergence between the pay rates of top civil servants and those of senior
executives in the private sector. Although the Review Body of 2000 pegged salaries for
Secretaries-General at 85% of the lowest quartile of private sector comparators (Review
Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector 2000, p.5), and the 2007 review factored
in public service pension entitlements, at a time of rising private sector management salaries
(Review Body on Higher Remuneration in the Public Sector 2007), this resulted in higher
differentials than previously in pay scales within the public service itself.
But there is some evidence that conditionality in awarding pay bonuses has not been very
tightly implemented. For example, the scheme of performance awards for senior public
servants, in place since 2001, saw approximately €3 million being distributed between 22110
public servants in respect of their work for 2007. Individuals can receive up to 20% of their
annual pay. Data for 2005-7 demonstrate that the awards tend to be above average in all
except the smallest award category, as Figure 2 below shows.
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Source: Committee for Performance Awards Annual Reports for 2007, 2006 (Dublin: Department of Finance,
2008 & 2007)
Time-limits were introduced to the service of Secretaries-General of Departments (seven
years). Until 2004 there were no restrictions on their transition to private sector employment,
including political lobbying. A new code of conduct stipulates a one-year cooling-off period,
and an Outside Appointments Board adjudicates on particular cases. Open promotional
opportunities encouraging mobility are also available to lower grades throughout the rest of
the civil service, managed through somewhat different channels.
A more general and wide-ranging reform of public sector pay determination has been
undertaken. Public sector pay had been a recurrent political problem for several decades.
Centralized pay pacts were negotiated continuously since 1987. But even these did not
succeed in breaking deeply-entrenched relativities and differentials that fuelled seemingly
endless leapfrogging wage claims within the public service (Boyle et al. 2004). This was11
eventually tackled in the early 2000s, under the provisions of the social partnership pay
agreement Programme for Prosperity and Fairness (PPF, 2000-2003), which set up a Public
Service Benchmarking Body (see http://www.finance.gov.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocId=-
1&CatID=31&m=c). Internal claims-generating links were supposed to have been finally
broken, and comparator links developed with the private sector. The recommendations for
differentiated pay increases made by a special benchmarking review board were intended to
signal major change. But the way the benchmarks were set was never made explicit. In the
context of powerful public sector unions and in the absence of market disciplines, strong
upward pressure on public sector pay continued to be apparent (Hardiman 2006).
The social partnership agreement Sustaining Progress (2003-5) included a provision that all
public service pay increases would require verification in order to ensure ‘satisfactory
achievement of the provisions on cooperation with flexibility and ongoing change’ (para
26.1). Performance Verification Groups were established for the main sectors of the public
service (civil service, health, local government, education and justice and equality – though
many state agencies were not included in the process), each with an independent chair and
comprised of equal union, management and independent members. A study of the process
found that it had had a positive effect on industrial relations stability, and helped develop co-
operation amongst staff with change processes and implementation of the modernization
programme (Boyle 2008, p.1). In almost all cases the remuneration awards were made.
Boyle also notes that participants in the process criticized that limited scope of the
modernization agenda as well as the generation of excessive paperwork and bureaucracy
which the process entailed.
The rationale for benchmarking is not altogether clear and has not been subject to much
discussion. Creating a link between public and private sector pay scales might be expected to
stem from either of two considerations:
1. To discipline a major part of the sheltered sector by tying it to the exposed tradable
sector, especially the exporting sector, to import competitiveness disciplines into the
public sector. Otherwise, the public sector can exert collective pressures with no clear
budget constraint, exerting political rather than economic influence on government;12
and the larger the public sector as a proportion of union membership, the more likely
this outcome (Garrett and Way 1999).
2. If the public sector reward structure is already low, and talent is draining out of it, an
overt link with comparable private sector remuneration structures may serve to make
public sector employment more attractive, and to retain talent and boost morale. The
problems here are that evidence about the relative attractiveness of occupations for
comparably qualified persons is hard to assess; and the non-monetized aspects of
public sector employment, such as security of tenure and guaranteed, defined-benefit
pension provisions, may not be adequately factored in (O'Leary 2002).
The consequences of changes in promotional structures and remuneration packages for the
functioning of the public administration have not been systematically investigated, but there
are some indications that a number of unanticipated consequences have ensued that may not
be consistent with increased efficiency or notably better governance. It is not clear that either
of the two criteria noted above played much role in shaping this outcome (Boyle et al. 2004).
As in other EU states, political leaders have sought for means of influence and control that
could reassert their power over the public sector (Peters and Pierre 2004). The appointment
of policy advisers and programme managers, allowed for by the Public Management Act
1997, adds further complexity at the political-administrative interface. Explicitly political
posts are limited to the term of office of the minister in office. Thus nothing as overt or as
extreme as the politicization of the top bureaucracy in post-communist Central European
states has taken place (Goetz 2001); nor is there any real evidence that party patronage is
systemic, as has happened in other countries (Mayntz and Derlien 1989; Milio 2008). But the
manner in which party-political interests and the public administration ethos are related is an
area that would seem to merit further investigation (O'Halpin 1996). And finally, opening
career mobility across Departments risks dispersing the expertise accumulated on the job,
which is a central feature of a generalist civil service, and thereby weakening the policy
competence of the public administration overall.13
2. Structures
Structural reorganization of the public service may flow from NPM ideas concerning the
value of disaggregating core public service competencies and devolving budgetary autonomy.
The rapid increase in the number of non-departmental and executive agencies in the OECD
has been a defining feature of public service reform over recent years. Indeed, the study of
‘agencification’ has itself emerged as a rich field of inquiry in public administration and
raises important questions concerning administrative autonomy, policy co-ordination and
political accountability (Christensen and Laegreid 2006). Of all aspects of reform, this kind
of structural change can happen relatively quickly. It can also be an attractive means of
allowing politicians to give policy focus to a particular policy issue (Hardiman and Scott
2009).
We note that over the period since 1990, there has been a marked increase in the rate of
increase of state agencies in Ireland, as Figure 3 below notes – even when we control for the
number of agencies that have been renamed or acquired new functions.
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Source: Mapping the Irish State database14
However the creation of new agencies has not been accompanied by any downsizing in
public service numbers, as NPM-style reorganization would predict, as seen in Figure 4:
Figure 4. Public service numbers by policy sector, 2000-2008
Source: Dáil Debates, 25 September 2008, Vol. 661, No. 2.
http://debates.oireachtas.ie/DDebate.aspx?F=DAL20080925.xml&Node=1617#N1617
It would appear that while many new agencies were set up, the rationale for doing so has not
been well articulated. The OECD suggest that the use of agencies allowed departments to
circumvent caps on civil service recruitment (OECD 2008, p.298). Their principal
justification appears to be that they can deal with new policy issues more efficiently than line
Departments. But a number of recent reports have drawn attention to weaknesses in setting
clear policy parameters for agencies, uneven political oversight, a tendency to populate
boards in a politicized manner, and a deficit in accountability mechanisms (Clancy and
Murphy 2006; McGauran et al. 2005; OECD 2008). Moreover, a serious implication for the
core civil service is that some doubt is inevitably cast over its capacity to handle complex
new policy challenges. As part of a packet of measure in the Budget for 2009 to cut public
spending in response to a deteriorating economic situation, the government reduced the
number of agencies by 39 overall, including mergers, closures and reabsorption of functions
into departments.15
The OECD report noted the continued existence of a ‘stovepipe’ model of public
administration – a parallel sequence of the fifteen constitutionally mandated government
Departments, across which policy initiatives must still wend a complicated route toward
evaluation and implementation. It proposed that no new structures for coordination were
necessary – instead, better ways of networking should be sought (OECD 2008, p.246).
3. Policy evaluation, co-ordination and implementation
A core tenet of NPM is the quantification of public service work. We certainly see a strong
move toward auditing and publishing public service performance indicators, output
statements and annual reports. But this is not the same thing as performance management
through target-setting, or budgetary disciplines for under-performance (though there is some
evidence of budgets being reduced for public bodies which fail to use their annual allocation).
European Union requirements for impact assessments encouraged a new dimension to policy
development within the public service, but the emphasis on ex-post audit remains. Use of
targets (individual or shared) as a means of incentivizing and disciplining public service
delivery is not well developed in Ireland. Furthermore, traditional problems of cross-
Departmental policy coordination still appear to be prevalent.
Indeed the pendulum between departmentalism and co-ordination has swung back firmly in
favour of the latter to address concerns over fragmentation of the public service. The
complexity of modern government in such that new mechanisms and behaviours are
necessary in order to develop whole-of-government coordination adequately. Based as they
are on the Westminster system, the central institutions of Irish government – Cabinet, civil
service and local authority – were established to overcome problems of co-ordination across
both political and administrative lines (Bogdanor 2005). The proliferation of agencies at
national (and local) level described above has generated considerable difficulties in policy co-
ordination, and no formal means of assessing quality of policy implementation exist.
Consistent delivery of quality public services continues to be a nut which governments are
unable to crack through structural means. Post-NPM emphasis on behavioural change
coupled with more centralized strategic policy co-ordination is now being pursued. The
development of a ‘performance dialogue’ between different parts of the public service – and16
particular departments and their agencies – is strongly advocated by the OECD (OECD 2008,
p.310).
4. Values
A move toward a more market-disciplined public administration might be expected to be
associated with a growing convergence in the values evinced by public and private sector
employees (Bozeman 2007). Certainly, the move toward improving standards of public
service is much in evidence in public statements: Departments have mission statements and
service delivery objectives; the public are routinely described as ‘customers’; the terminology
of efficiency is widely used.
But underlying this there would seem to be a continued difference in public employees’
conception of their role and functions that is at odds with market rhetoric. While evidence is
as yet somewhat limited, focus group research reveals a strong ethos of public service and a
commitment to values that are not purely those of the market (Mac Cárthaigh 2008). Public
service work was identified in terms of general interest, impartiality, equity, as opposed to
private sector emphasis on market criteria, which respondents associated with selective
benefits, profitability at the expense of equity.
Some of the functioning of central government departments and major agencies have
undergone change consistent with New Public Management criteria. This is reflected for
example in the requirement to give a more transparent account of themselves than previously
through a range of strategy and output statements, more numerous and explicit sectoral policy
statements, and through their increased availability to Oireachtas committees. But we would
suggest that career structures, remuneration scales, and public sector pay determination more
generally, have been more significantly altered in the light of a public sector modernization
agenda. We note that some unanticipated consequences may have ensued. However, issues
about quality of public administration and good governance in general may be escaping our
attention by adopting a focus that is confined to concerns with public management measures.17
Quality of Government in Ireland
What impact does all this public sector reform activity have on government performance
though? And what is the appropriate measure of quality of government in any case? Among
the varying attempts at definitions we find the following:
Political scientists have tended to give pride of place to governmental systems that
embody democratic principles and practices supported by the rule of law. Economists
have tended to evaluate systems of government, and institutions in general, in terms
of their perceived ability to foster economic growth (sometimes with regard also for
the distribution of the resulting goods and services)… (we) employ survey measures
of life satisfaction as though they were direct measures of utility, and use them to
evaluate alternative features and forms of government (Helliwell and Huang 2008,
p.595).
In our view, individual life satisfaction measures are shaped by such a wide variety of factors
that this measure over-shoots the target; we prefer to focus on institutional indicators. Yet on
all the principal comparative indicators of good governance based on considerations such as
administrative impartiality and respect for the rule of law, Ireland actually performs quite
well. Ireland performs quite well in the World Bank governance indicators of good
governance (Kaufmann et al. 2008). Ireland’s ranking ebbs and flows somewhat from year to
year in the international ranking of perceptions of corruption compiled by Transparency
International, ranking at joint 9
th place at the world with Britain in 2008 – see:
http://www.transparency.org/news_room/in_focus/2008/cpi2008/cpi_2008_table. If numbers
are a clue to efficiency, Ireland should also be doing well, since the recent OECD review
found that ‘The proportion of employees involved in administrative tasks remains in the
lower tier of OECD countries’ (OECD 2008, p.64). But the main issues that commentators
believe still afflict the quality of policy making and implementation are not well captured by
these measures.
Let us consider how Ireland stands in comparative indicators of quality of government. One
of the widest-ranging is that developed by the Dutch Social and Cultural Planning Office,
which considers quality of government to be based on perceptions of the quality of
bureaucracy, transparency, effectiveness and corruption (Dutch Social and Cultural Planning
Office 2004, p.267). Drawing on these criteria, Boyle compares aspects of public sector
performance and efficiency across states (Boyle 2007). Figure 5 shows that Ireland’s
summary score in 2006 is outstripped only by Denmark, Finland, and Austria.18
Figure 5. Quality of government scores, 2006
Source: Boyle 2007, adapted from Institute for Management Development World Competitiveness Yearbook
2006 (Lausanne: IMD, 2006)
Over the 2001-6 period, Ireland’s score was broadly in line with the EU15 average, as Figure
6 below indicates.
Figure 6. Changes in quality of government scores, 2001-6
Source: Boyle 2007, adapted from Institute for Management Development World Competitiveness Yearbook
2006 (Lausanne: IMD, 2006)19
Adding another four indicators – fairness in administration of justice, level of administrative
independence from political interference, the extent to which the legal and regulatory
framework encourages competitiveness among enterprises, and the level of regulation
intensity – reveals no significant change (Ireland moves slightly above Sweden), as Figure 7
shows.
Figure 7. Scores on expanded range of quality of government measures
Source: Boyle 2007, adapted from Institute for Management Development World Competitiveness Yearbook
2006 (Lausanne: IMD, 2006)
Using these eight criteria for assessing quality of government, the results can be contrasted
with spending per capita in the EU 15 states. Figure 8 shows that Ireland scores quite well
here: for relatively low levels of expenditure per capita, the score out of 10 only lags behind
Austria, Finland and Denmark and is actually better than the scores for the Netherlands and
Sweden.20
Figure 8. Quality of public administration and expenditure per capita on general public
services
Source: Boyle 2007, adapted from Institute for Management Development World Competitiveness Yearbook
2006 (Lausanne: IMD, 2006)
Additional questions
We consider that performance on these scores, while gratifying, may reveal more about the
limitations of the measures than about the nature and functioning of state institutions. The
indicators are useful for capturing Rothstein and Teorell’s conception of impartiality – low
levels of personal or procedural corruption, appropriate lines of accountability for resource
allocation, and adherence to the rule of law. However, questions that have been raised about
the way policy is made and implemented, held accountable, and subject to quality
assessment, may perhaps escape these measures. We identify three broad areas which we
briefly outline below: quality and skill levels, efficiency, and accountability.
Quality and skill levels
As noted above, there may be reasons for concern about the policy capabilities of the core
public administration. An increasing reliance on agencies means that many new tasks are
taken away from departments. Of all the agencies set up since 1990, one study suggested that
about a quarter were created to ‘provide advice’, normally a function of the senior civil21
service (McGauran et al. 2005). Over the same period, there has been an increasing reliance
on the use of private sector consultants to conduct research and prepare policy papers, write
reports, etc. At the same time, traditional rigidities in hiring procedures, arising from reliance
on classic bureaucratic appointments procedures, may make it difficult to recruit and retain
people with specialized professional skills. The Department of Finance, for example, finds it
difficult to hold onto trained economists. This indicates that there may be some deficits in the
capabilities and skills available within the civil service itself, not least because the recent
economic boom saw the public service become less attractive an employer when compared
with the major financial and IT companies.
As noted above, a skills deficit may be exacerbated by new possibilities of career mobility
across departments, arising from precisely the area of reform that is most consonant with
NPM ideals. This tends to disperse expertise acquired through on-the-job experience and to
create discontinuities in dealing with clients or delivering services. Routine administrative
procedures occupy most people’s time and the capacity to engage in serious assessment of
alternative courses of policy action may be rather limited. Agenda-setting is highly dependent
on the core executive. Other arenas for policy debate have emerged in the context of social
partnership, and each agreement has created a web of working groups bringing together civil
servants with representatives of union, employer, and voluntary sector organizations. But
these do not displace or even seriously shape the work of departments, whose agenda is set
by the relevant government minister. The Department of the Taoiseach and the Department of
Finance appear to play the leading role in transmitting many of these priorities.
Policy coordination across departments has also been subject to criticism, most recently by
the OECD’s 2008 report, which notes the continuing ‘stovepipe’ of parallel departments and
sometimes rather scattered agencies, with myriad cross-cutting policy coordination
requirements. There are some well-established routines for managing these, including the
circulation of draft legislation for comment from all relevant interests, and both routine and
ad hoc coordination meetings at all levels, including Secretaries-General. Yet governments
have also found it necessary to experiment with additional coordination resources, such as
Programme Managers attached to government ministers during the 1990s (O'Halpin 1996),
and the growing use by all ministers of special advisers, press officers, and personal staff who
are on the public payroll.22
Efficiency
Issues about efficiency, whether in project expenditure or in work practices, have as yet been
relatively under-examined in debates about reform of the Irish public service. These are of
course some of the classic problem areas that NPM was originally designed to address.
The use of policy evaluation metrics to assess the quality and value-for-money of specific
policy initiatives or expenditure items is still developing, but varies between different parts of
the public service. This is still the case even where it has been strongly recommended in
specific contexts, such as in the acute hospital sector where clinical evaluation standards, for
example, are still quite underdeveloped. Systematic value-for-money and quality assessment
reviews had been a required part of EU Structural Funds, and Irish public administration
developed a reputation for more efficient use of these resources than other cohesion states.
But the practice is not well embedded. The Comptroller and Auditor-General, and the debates
on these reports at the Dáil Public Accounts Committee, are likely to function as a periodic
alarm system, drawing attention to particular areas in which public spending is opened to
public review and scrutiny.
Irish public sector employees have, under the terms of partnership agreements, signed up to a
Performance Management and Development System that is intended to deliver ever-
increasing productivity improvements; the public sector unions have accepted this. But in the
absence of a driving political commitment, those most likely to be affected are perhaps
unlikely to invent procedures that would make life more unpleasant for themselves. The
public sector accounts for up to one-third of employment in Ireland. Approximately 40% of
the workforce is unionized. But the distribution of union membership is highly differentiated.
In private sector services the numbers are estimated at about 10%, while in the public sector
it is about 80%. Within the trade union movement itself, about half the membership comes
from the public sector.
Accountability
Some shortcomings have recently come to light on issues to do with accountability for policy
mistakes. The foundational legislation is the Ministers and Secretaries Act 1924, which
accorded the minister personal responsibility for all actions engaged in by the department
under her or his control.23
In recognition of the growing complexity of the public service, this was modified by the 1997
Public Service Management Act. The Act provides a legal basis for new management
structures to enhance the accountability of civil servants while preserving the discretion of
the government in relation to their responsibility to parliament. The Act placed particular
emphasis on the managerial role of Secretaries-General (heads of government departments)
which complements their more traditional roles in relation to policy formulation and advice
provision.
But in a number of scandals in recent years, it has proved extremely difficult to secure
accountability from anyone when things go wrong. Parliamentary committees may summon
and question civil servants; but their powers to pursue answers and apportion responsibility
are quite weak. In many instances, parliamentary inquiries were unable to establish the facts
of policy error, resulting in the establishment of expensive and protracted Tribunals of
Inquiry. For example, in Ireland as elsewhere, great harm was done to various categories of
people through blood contamination; yet personal responsibility for outcomes proved all but
impossible to allocate (Farrell 2005; Mac Cárthaigh 2005). Rather than receiving cross-party
acceptance, the reports of such Tribunals tend to be vigorously contested on a partisan basis.
The corollary of problems in apportioning responsibility and ensuring accountability is a
decline of the public’s trust in the institutions of state – not on account of corruption, but on
account of efficiency and reliability. Over the last two decades, the Irish public scored
unusually highly in the levels of trust they displayed for social and political institutions such
as the Catholic Church, parliament, the police force, journalists, and the civil service. The
scores for all of these have fallen, partly no doubt as a consequence of rapid social, economic,
and demographic change, partly due to the eruption of scandals in many of these areas, and
partly perhaps because of the growth of a more disputatious public sphere in which people
are less willing to take authority on trust (Geissel 2008). The public administration has not
suffered as badly as other bodies in the general fall of their status in public esteem. But it
might be suggested that a highly critical and questioning citizen body is perhaps the best
guarantee any democracy can have that its institutions are held up to the mark to perform
well.24
Conclusion
We have noted that some of the problems that are currently identified as requiring attention in
Irish public administration are precisely the ones that NPM was intended to remedy. But it is
not clear that NPM has provided all the answers either. Indeed, Groot and Budding’s survey
of Dutch public servants found that half of respondents regarded current NPM-based reforms
as a temporary condition beyond which would emerge a new multistructured relationship
between central government and its agencies (Groot and Budding 2008, p.4). The remainder
saw reforms as leading to the dominance of NPM orthodoxy (23%) and a strong centralised
state (27%) respectively. Given the drift toward a variety of new coordination initiatives in
the post-NPM environment, they seem to be right.
We have noted that public sector reform in Ireland was initiated within a context which
certainly displayed a strong ethos of public service values and the distinctiveness of public
service. But this was also embedded in a culture of public sector self-preservation and strong
public sector unions. Indeed, the organizational strength of employees in the civil service, and
in service sectors such as teaching, various areas of health services, police, prison officers,
and so on, implies something of a reversal in principal-agent theory. Yet in a context of very
weak left-right polarity in the political system and a strong bias toward cross-class, catchall
politics, none of the governing parties had any real incentive to undertake strong
ideologically-driven reforms of the public sector, particularly if these were going to result in
overt conflict. The result has been a negotiated approach to public sector reform which has
had quite mixed performance effects.
The problems of efficiency, policy fragmentation, and institutional differentiation are now
coming under greater scrutiny in the context of a concern with what is termed a ‘whole-of-
government’ approach to policy processes. The OECD report, reinforced by budgetary
difficulties, is likely to stimulate some reorganization of agencies. But the other issues we
have noted are not much in focus at present – those of skills deficits, the potential for the
dispersal of expertise and the politicization of promotions, and the issues of who is really
accountable when things go wrong. Inevitably, in Ireland, it seems ‘the system is to blame’.25
Appendix 1. Timeline of public sector reform initiatives in Ireland
1994 Establishment in January of Co-ordinating Group of Secretaries.
May: launch by then Taoiseach (Prime Minister) Albert Reynolds of
the Strategic Management Initiative (SMI).
End year: departments start to produce Strategy Statements.
1996 Publication of Delivering Better Government (DBG).
1997 Public Service Management Act 1997.
Quality Customer Service Initiative and first publication by
departments of individual Customer Service Action Plans.
Houses of the Oireachtas (Compellability, Privileges and Immunity of
Witnesses) Act 1997.
Freedom of Information Act 1997.
Presentation of the first Strategy Statement under the Public Service
Management Act 1997.
1998 Government Approval given for Multi-Annual Budgets and enhanced
Administrative Budgets.
Establishment of All Party Oireachtas Committee on the SMI (Note:
the Joint Oireachtas Committee on Finance and the Public Service
now deals with modernisation and reform issues).
1999 Design of new Civil Service policies and systems on HRM and
Performance Management.
Government approval of Financial Management system.
Announcement of radical programme of Regulatory Reform.
Initiatives in relation to e-Government, e-Commerce and the
Information Society.
Publication by departments of first Annual Reports under the terms of
the Public Service Management Act 1997.
2000 Launch of Performance Management and Development System
(PMDS) for the civil service.
2001 OECD report: Regulatory Reform in Ireland.
Agreement on an Action Programme and National Action Strategy on
Better Regulation.
2002 Independent Evaluation on SMI (PA Evaluation).
Independent Evaluation on Quality Customer Service (Butler).26
Independent Evaluation on Partnership (J.J. O’Dwyer andAssociates).
Review of Partnership within the Civil Service (National Centre for
Partnership and Performance).
Benchmarking Report.
European Union (Scrutiny) Act 2002.
2003 Publication of Social Partnership Agreement Sustaining Progress –
includes commitments in relation to public service modernisation.
Establishment of Performance Verification Groups to monitor and
report on progress in implementing the modernisation agenda.
2004 Publication of the Government White Paper, Regulating Better: this
sets out a detailed Action Plan to advance regulatory reform.
Piloting of Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA).
PMDS Evaluation (Mercer): main recommendation to integrate PMDS
with wider HR system, including assessment systems.
Public Services Management (Recruitment and Appointments) Act.
Civil Service Code of Standards Agreed.
2005 Integrated PMDS model: integration with increments, promotions,
higher scales.
Introduction of Regulatory Impact Analysis.
2006 Publication of Social Partnership Agreement Towards 2016 contains
further commitments in relation to modernisation of the public service
2008 Publication of the OECD’s Review of the Irish Public Service27
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